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Abstract
This paper adds some new arguments to the thesis that the re-
sponsibility for banking supervision should be assigned to an agency
formally separated by the Central bank. We also provide some ad-
ditional evidence on the macro and microeconomic performance of
OECD countries whose banking systems are classied according to
the regulatory regime in place. We nd that the ination rate is con-
siderably higher and more volatile in countries where the Central bank
acts as a monopolist in banking supervision. Besides, although banks
seem to be more protable when Central banks supervise them, they
incur into higher costs and rely more on deposits with respect to more
sophisticated liabilities as a funding source.
The data are not denitively in favor of functional separation.
However, we argue that the evolution of nancial intermediaries, moral
hazard problems and especially cost accountability seem to suggest
that separation would be a better solution for industrialized countries.
We also critically discuss the current arrangement of nancial reg-
ulation and supervision in the EMU: our proposal is to establish an
independent European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) struc-
tured similarly to the ESCB.
Keywords: Banking Supervision, Financial Stability, Regulatory
Arrangements.
JEL: E6, G2
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1 Introduction
In the last decades, the evolution of nancial markets, instruments and inter-
mediaries has been enormous. This has been a common feature all over the
world, from industrialized to developing countries. At the same time, the
evolution of regulation and supervision of nancial markets has been quite
dierent across countries and it is dicult to identify which features charac-
terize optimal solutions in terms of the adopted supervisory and regulatory
arrangements.
In most countries, an important role in the governance of the nancial sys-
tem has traditionally been performed by the Central bank. However, since
nowadays it is widely accepted that "the fundamental task of the Central
bank is to preserve the value of the currency" (Fischer, 1997), the assign-
ment to Central banks of other "optional" tasks as the responsibility on
banking supervision and regulation is currently at the centre of a relevant
policy debate. This feature constitutes a striking dierence among modern
nancial systems: in a few countries monetary policy and banking supervi-
sion are still assigned to a unique agency, the Central bank; while in many
other countries, these two functions are formally separated and the bank-
ing supervision is assigned to another agency or to more than one agency,
eventually in combination with the Central bank.
A system of banking supervision, in order to be eective, must "have clear
responsibilities and objectives for each agency involved in the supervision
of banks. Each such agency should possess operational independence and
adequate resources"
1
. Can the combination of dierent responsibilities and
objectives in one agency result in weak banking supervision and negatively
aect monetary policy?
In spite of its importance, this topic has not yet received an exhaustive
treatment in the economic literature, with only a few recent papers starting
to investigate the issue.
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Given that a sound theoretical analysis is still
on the research agenda, most of the empirical studies have been devoted to
check whether any relation between the combination of monetary policy and
supervisory powers and the pattern of some macroeconomic variables (like
the ination rate or GDP growth) could be obtained.
3
Even though no
1
Principle no. 1 of the core principles for banking supervision, Basle Committee, 1997.
2
See Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1992,1995), Heller (1991), Haubrich (1996), Peek,
Rosengren and Tootell (1997) and Tuya and Zamalloa (1994).
3
Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) analyze the microeconomic evidence between cen-
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path toward one or the other solution was proved to be clearly superior,
some recent events seem to indicate that a denitive separation of the two
functions is becoming more popular.
 In May 1997, the United Kingdom decided to attribute banking su-
pervision, until then in charge of the Bank of England, to the former
Securities and Investment Board, renamed Financial Services Author-
ity. The FSA now supervises all nancial markets and intermediaries.
4
 In the United States, where banking supervision is not an exclusive
attribution of the Central bank, many proposals have been presented
in the last years to simplify the structure of regulation and supervision
on nancial markets, merging some of the agencies (like the FDIC and
the Comptroller of the Currency) in one entity, eventually dierent
from the FED (Shull, 1993; Coee, 1995; Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia, 1997).
 In the European Monetary Union (EMU), the principle of separating
monetary policy and banking supervision responsibilities has been for-
mally established in the statute of the European Central Bank (ECB).
The latter empowers the ECB to set out and conduct monetary policy
in the Euro area, but leaves the responsibility for banking supervision
with the national authorities
5
.
 The evolution of nancial intermediaries, markets and instruments blurs
the borders among banking, securities and insurance activities; as the
specicity of banks becomes less relevant, the solution of establishing
tral banks separation or combination of powers and the number and characteristics of
bank failures.
4
At the same time, the degree of independence of the Bank of England was considerably
strengthened by giving the Bank a full operational responsibility for setting interest rates.
5
According to Green (1995) the Treaty on European Union leaves some space to pru-
dential supervision responsibility of the European Central Bank (ECB): "Article 105 (5)
of the Treaty states that the European System of Central Banks 'shall contribute to ...
prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the nancial system'. In
105 (6) there is reference to the possibility that the ECB may be asked to undertake spe-
cic tasks in relation to 'prudential supervision of credit institutions and other nancial
institutions with the exception of insurance undertakings'.
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a common regulator for the prudential regulation of all intermediaries
gains ground. This is coherent with both the new theories of nancial
intermediation (Merton, 1993; Allen and Santomero, 1997; Allen and
Gale, 1997) and some recent discussions of regulatory arrangements
(Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994, Di Giorgio and Di Noia, 1999).
This paper aims at extending some of the theoretical arguments made in
favour of separation of monetary policy and banking supervision functions,
in particular by discussing the problem of who should pay for banking su-
pervision. We also review the empirical evidence on the relationship between
macroeconomic variables and supervisory regimes and we provide some addi-
tional evidence based on the pricing structure of banks in dierent countries
and their aggregate balance sheets. Our arguments and ndings are some-
how (though not denitively) supporting the view that banking supervision
should be separated and assigned to a dierent agency in the few coun-
tries where it is still combined with the Central bank. Finally, we criticize
the current assignment of nancial regulation and supervisory powers in the
EMU and suggest to establish an independent European System of Financial
Supervisors (ESFS) as a device to attain a sounder scenario.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe our classica-
tion of the supervisory regimes in place in dierent countries. In section 3 we
provide some empirical ndings that emerge when comparing the macroeco-
nomic and microeconomic performances of countries where the central bank
acts as a monopolist in banking supervision with those of countries where
it does not. In section 4, we discuss the pros and cons of the combination
and separation of powers, by presenting rst a quick review of the traditional
arguments developed in the literature (4.1 and 4.2), and by adding some new
theoretical considerations in favour of the separation solution (4.3). Section
5 deals with the problem of nancial stability in Europe. We summarize our
arguments in section 6.
2 Supervisory arrangements
A neat comparison and classication of dierent structures of banking su-
pervision and, in general, nancial supervision in countries all over the world
is a dicult target to reach, given the peculiar institutional arrangements
that characterize each single economic system. In some countries, an agency
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in charge of these functions may be formally separated by the Central bank
but acting so closely to it that it could eectively be more dependent on the
Central bank with respect to, say, the banking supervision department of
another country's Central bank.
A recent study conducted by the IMF (Tuya and Zamalloa, 1994) pro-
vides one of the most complete pictures of the situation.
6
It shows that in
the 167 then Member Countries, "bank supervision is conducted by the Cen-
tral bank in over 60 per cent and that the Western Hemisphere
7
was the only
region where the percentage declined to 50 percent. Nevertheless, in over 80
per cent of Asian, African and Middle Eastern countries, banking supervision
is a function of the Central bank" (Tuya and Zamalloa, 1994); moreover, in
75 per cent of European countries (dierent from the former U.S.S.R. coun-
tries), banking supervision was a function assigned to Central banks. The
problem with these numbers is that they take into account many very small
States (like Sao Tome, Myanmar, Vanuatu, etc.) and that the classication
method includes all countries in which some supervisory powers are given
to Central banks and not whether Central banks have monopoly power in
banking supervision or cooperate with other entities.
8
In our paper, in order to be as precise as possible, we classify the countries
in two categories: those where the Central bank acts as a monopolist in
banking supervision, on one side; all the others (where Central bank is not in
charge of it or, in any case, is not the only agency in charge), on the other side.
Moreover, we focus only on OECD countries (table 1)
9
, where the situation
looks quite dierent with respect to the one depicted in the previously quoted
6
Other studies are Heller (1991), Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995), Haubrich (1996).
7
In that paper, countries had been divided following Fund area department allocations:
Africa, Asia, Europe I, Europe II, middle East and Western Hemishere.
8
Hence, for example, France is classied among the countries where banking supervi-
sion is operated by the Central bank, while the Banque de France is not really a monopolist
in banking supervision given that the Commission Bancaire (a composite body chaired by
the Governor of the Banque the France, with representatives from the Treasury) supervises
compliance with the prudential regulation and send inspections and on-site examinations
which are carried out by employees of the Banque the France.
9
We consider only the countries that joined the OECD by 1994, Mexico being the last
one. Other four countries were admitted later on: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea
and Poland.
6
IMF review: in fact, a complete monopoly of Central banks in banking
supervision seems more likely in countries with an underdeveloped nancial
system, and a few internationally active banks.
10
.
(table 1, insert here)
Table 1 shows that in many nancially developed countries, banking su-
pervision is now not (or not any more) a monopoly of the Central bank.
Among the G-5, only UK could be considered as a country where monetary
policy and banking supervision were combined. As already stressed, this is
no longer true after the 1997 reform.
Given that classication in one or another category is inherently sub-
jective, we take as a rst proxy for the institutional framework of banking
supervision the composition of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion, at least for member countries. In fact, in the Committee, "countries
are represented by their central banks and also by the authority with formal
responsibility for the prudential supervision of banking business where this in
not the Central bank" (Basle Committee, 1997, emphasis added). This means
that if a Central bank is a monopolist in supervision only its representatives
are admitted to the Committee; if some countries are represented by members
beyond central banks, it means that other institutions are responsible. It
turns out that in the Basle Committee only 4 countries (Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands and United Kingdom) were represented only by Central bank
ocers; while the other 8 countries were represented not only by the Central
bank but also by another agency (in the case of USA by other 3 agencies
11
).
This means that in 66% of the Basle Committee countries (without taking
10
Two relevant exceptions are the United Kingdom, until the 1997 reform, and Italy.
Measuring the degree of nancial development of dierent economies is a dicult task. As
a very preliminar evidence of the fact that "monopolist" central banks tend to operate in
countries whose nancial systems are less developed, we have used the synthetic index of
nancial development derived by Di Giorgio and Reichlin (1996) for EU countries. This
index combines pieces of information based on two of the nancial indicators used by King
and Levine (1993) - nancial depth and the ratio of credit to the non nancial private sector
to total domestic credit - plus other three sources (weight of the nancial sector in total
employment, the lending-borrowing spread, and the eciency of the payment system).
This index is considerably lower in the rst half of the 90s (2.6 against 3.1) in countries
where the central bank is a monopolist in banking supervision. The dierence is more
striking (2.2 to 3.1) if we exclude UK (whose nancial index is the highest in the sample)
from the analysis.
11
FDIC, OCC and the Federal Reserve of New York.
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into account the recent institutional change in the UK) Central banks did
not have monopoly in banking supervision.
When we look at all OECD countries (25 until 1994), we follow previ-
ous work by Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1992), Masciandaro (1993) and
Haubrich (1996) and classify only in 11 cases (44%) Central banks as mo-
nopolists in banking supervision.
3 Empirical evidence
3.1 Macroeconomic Analysis
3.1.1 The Ination Rate
Empirical evidence on the best choice of banking supervisory agencies can
only be provided by looking at ex-post micro and macro data in dierent
countries.
Most of the early papers (Heller, 1991; Goodhart and Shoenmaker, 1992
and 1995; Masciandaro, 1993) compared the track record of central banks
with supervisory responsibilities with that of central banks without regula-
tory tasks in achieving the central goal of monetary policy, a low ination
rate. All these studies support the thesis that Central banks without super-
visory responsibilities have a better ination track record. Instead, no clear
correlation can be established between dierent supervisory arrangements
and real growth rates.
We start by re-examining this evidence for industrialized countries ac-
cording to our previous classication of the banking supervisory regime in
place. We consider the consumer price index from the IMF Financial Statis-
tics and compare the average ination rate from 1960 to 1996 in 24 OECD
countries (excluding Mexico).
It is evident that even among quite homogeneous economies, average in-
ation is more than double (11.21 versus 5.09) in countries where the Central
bank is a monopolist in banking supervision.
12
Even if we exclude Iceland
and Turkey the situation does not change much: ination is 50% higher in
"monopolist" countries (7.64 versus 5,09) (table 2 and graphs 1 and 2).
12
We include Luxembourg among the "monopolist" countries even if the Luxembourg
Monetary Institute was established in 1983: if we exclude it ination would be even higher
in "monopolist" countries.
8
(table 2 and graphs 1 and 2, insert here)
Heller (1991) connected the problem of the institutional separation of the
two functions with the one of the independency of the Central bank
13
: "it
may well be that independent central banks are better in attaining the goal
of price stability and that these independent banks also do not tend to have
supervisory responsibilities".
14
In any case, simple correlations between variables can not be interpreted
as suggesting any causal relationship.
Hence, we turn to a simple regression in order to check the robustness of
this result. We estimate an equation in which average ination in the sample
is the dependent variable and we include among the regressors a dummy vari-
able for countries where banking supervision is assigned to Central banks in
monopoly. We also include the index of Central bank independence derived
by Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), in order to control for the pos-
sibility that any eect of the banking supervisory regime on ination would
just reect a poorer degree of independence of the Central banks to which
this task is assigned.
15
The estimated equation is
INFL
60 96
= 9:29   0:47GMT + 1:48MON R
2
= 0:64
(1:2) (0:7) (0:1)
13
Also Masciandaro (1993) links the problem of Central bank independence with the
assignment of supervisory responsibilities. After dividing Central banks in four classes
(monopolist in supervision and independent; monopolist in supervision and dependent;
not monopolist in supervision and independent; not monopolist in supervision and depen-
dent.), he nds that all Central banks with monopoly in banks supervision have a worse
ination record, a higher money rate of growth and a higher ratio decit/GNP. Moreover,
among OECD countries, dependent Central banks are associated with a lower real rate of
GDP growth.
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"In a way this argument, if found to be true, would support the basic hypothesis:
namely that bank supervisory responsibility is a governmental function that is unlikely
to be given to a truly independent Central bank. In other words, the supervisory role
for a Central bank does tend to be associated with signicant strings in terms of greater
dependence on the government" (Heller, 1991).
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Bini Smaghi (1998b) conducted the same analysis in a smaller sample (1974-90) and
obtained similar results. He nds that the dummy variable related to the assignment of
supervisory powers to central banks remains a signicant determinant of ination perfor-
mance even when dierent indicators of central bank independence, as the ones constructed
by Alesina and Summers (1993) or Cuckierman (1992) are included in the regression.
9
where standard errors are reported in parenthesis, GMT is the indepen-
dence index and MON our dummy.
16
Central bank independence is signicantly (and negatively) aecting in-
ation performance. The hypothesis that banking supervision conducted
monopolistically by Central banks does not aect ination is instead rejected.
If a Central bank were less able to control prices given the eventual trade-
o with nancial stability, we would also expect higher variance in price
movements. In order to control for the fact that dierent levels of ination
might induce dierent variances for equal percentage variations, we calculate
for the same countries the coecient of variation (the ratio of standard de-
viation over average). We nd that the value is higher (13%) where Central
bank supervise banks (69% versus 61%), thereby suggesting that these Cen-
tral banks meet more diculties in smoothing ination over time (table 2).
Again, excluding Iceland and Turkey the result is basically the same: 66%
versus 61% (10% higher in monopolist countries).
3.1.2 Interest rates
We now turn to investigate whether the pricing behavior of banks, which
in a way reects their eciency in performing their most typical activity,
is aected by the supervisory regime in place. A rst indicator to consider
is the spread between the rate of return on bank assets and liabilities: in
particular we look at the spread between the average deposit and lending
rates in dierent countries.
We also divide this spread into its basic components, i.e. a mark-up on
loans and a mark-down on deposits. This exercise is interesting as it allows
to identify what the real sources of prots for banks (in net interest income)
are.
17
We restrict the analysis to a subset of the OECD countries due to avail-
ability of data. In particular we analyze only countries for which the same
series on deposit rates, lending rates and short term government bond rates
18
are available for the period 1981-95. We have two groups of European coun-
tries: the "monopolist" countries are Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and
16
Iceland, Turkey and Luxembourg are excluded.
17
Notice that these gures are only percentage values, and are not weighed with the
absolute amount of deposit and loans.
18
They are, respectively, series 60l, 60p and 60c of IMF International Financial Statistics.
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United Kingdom; the "not-monopolist" countries are Belgium, Germany,
Sweden and Switzerland
19
.
Although the spread does not show signicant dierences among the two
groups of countries, what is interesting to notice is its composition: the mark-
down on depositors is three times higher in countries where Central banks
are monopolist in supervision, and conversely mark-up is three times higher
in "not-monopolist" countries (table 3 and graph 3).
(table 3 and graph 3, insert here)
This would seem to suggest that banks not supervised by Central Banks
are better in doing the lending activity or, at least, have more bargaining
power with respect to borrowers. Notice that this feature does not depend
on the fact that these banks operate in somehow underdeveloped nancial
systems. Instead, in "monopolist" countries, banks seem to benet more by
exploiting depositors who keep money in bank deposits at a rate considerably
lower than the risk free rate. Of course, it is dicult to believe that this kind
of "rent" will last long in a more and more integrated nancial framework,
meaning that "high mark-down" banks will have to quickly increase non-
interest income if they want to avoid to encounter severe troubles in the
future.
The "low mark-up" observed in "monopolist" countries may be a sign of
strong competition in the lending activity. On the other side, banks might
have lowered too much their lending rates in order to capture in any case the
borrowers
20
or, may be, for political pressures, etc.
3.2 Microeconomic Analysis
3.2.1 Bank Protability and Costs
Goodhart and Shoemaker (1992 and 1995) use microeconomic data from a
dataset of 104 banks failures in 24 countries and show that countries where
Central banks are involved in banking supervision experience statistically
signicant fewer failures
21
.
19
The nancial structure of some important countries, like Japan or USA is too dierent
to make meaningful comparisons.
20
This could also indicate a higher bargaining power of rms with respect to banks, for
example due to relevant size asimmetries.
21
As Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) make clear this conclusion does not entail any
welfare judgement. It is not obviuos at all whether the cost of a bank failure is more or
11
In this section we try to analyze if there is any evidence of an impact of
the institutional arrangements of banking supervision over the structure and
behavior of banks, comparing countries where Central banks are "monopo-
list" with those where they are "not-monopolist".
Comparisons among banks of dierent countries are inevitably awed
due to legal and accounting procedures; besides, it is the structure itself of
dierent nancial systems that makes dierences inevitable, as institutions
"called" banks operate such dierent activities in dierent countries. In order
to minimize these errors we take OECD data from Bank Protability and
we compare the "all banks" series and the "commercial banks
22
" series, for
"monopolist" and "not-monopolist" countries, during the period 1985-94
23
.
We then consider four groups of data normalized by with the balance
sheet dimension and (gross and net) bank income. For the "monopolist"
countries we calculate an average of results with and without Turkey given
the deep dierences in both the real and nancial sectors of this country.
24
Table 4 insert here
We do not really nd clear patterns in favor of one or another institu-
tional arrangement, even though some interesting facts arise. For example,
gross income of "all banks", normalized by the average balance sheet total,
is 40% higher where the Central bank supervises banks and net income is
85% higher, too. A similar result is valid for data on "commercial banks".
Even with higher provisions as a percentage of the total balance
25
, banks in
less compensated by the loss of eciency in resource allocation and other costs linked to
its bail out.
22
For Denmark and Iceland we use the "commercial banks and savings banks" series.
23
There are some exception due to availability of OECD data. The starting data for
some countries are dierent: Australia (1986), Austria (1987), France (1988), Greece
(1989), Italy (1989).
24
OECD data do not include Ireland. We only report the table with the average num-
bers. Data for individual countries are contained in OECD, Bank Protability, 1997.
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Even though OECD data report higher total provisions with respect to the average
balance sheet total in monopolist countries, Jappelli and Pagano (1998) have estimated
both non performing loans and loan loss provisions for loans as a percentage of total loans
in a larger set of countries and obtained strikingly dierent results. When we look at their
estimates we notice that on average, loss provisions on loans are 3 times higher (0.75 aginst
0.25) in not-monopolist countries (Table X). With the caveat associated to the dierent
content of aggregated data in heterogeneous countries, this conclusion could be suggestive
of the presence of a moral hazard problem in the banking sectors supervised by Central
12
"monopolist" countries show higher prots in average, both before and after
tax.
These results could suggest that banking supervision assigned to Central
banks can be associated with more protable banking sectors. On the other
side, the data obviously regard only surviving banks. There could be ac-
counting rules and supervisory regulations in place that may allow "insider"
banks to resist entrance from outsiders and thus show prots that in the long
run should not last.
With this caveat, better comparable "eciency" indicators can be de-
rived by looking at the cost side. Here, "monopolist" countries have banks
whose sta costs are 50% higher than those in not-monopolist countries (as
a percentage of total balance). In particular sta costs represent more than
half of operating expenses in monopolist countries.
3.2.2 Balance sheet structure
When we analyze the strucutre of both the asset and liability sides of the
average balance sheets for the four groups of series, some other features have
to be underlined. For example, in the asset side, loans are relatively lower
in monopolist countries (more evidently for commercial banks). Another
dierence is that where Central banks supervise, then they maintain a closer
relationship with the supervised banks in the sense that the cash and balance
with the Central bank aggregate is 300% higher in monopolist countries:
this is probably due to dierent compulsory reserve requirements, with this
instrument used both as a monetary policy tool and a guarantee for deposit
protection where a single agency is responsible for both monetary policy and
the stability of the banking system.
On the liability side, it is to enlight the dierent use of nancial in-
strumets, with monopolist countries characterized by a higher percentage of
non bank deposits, and not-monopolist countries issuing about 50% of bonds
more.
3.2.3 Market Structure in EU countries.
A recent study conducted by the ECB (1999) allows to compare dierent ca-
pacity indicators and features of the banking systems in the EU countries. In
banks: in monopolist countries loss provisions on loans are lower as banks internalize that
the regulator-supervisor will more easily bail them out in case of trouble.
13
table 5 we report 1996 data on the number of branches, ATMs and employees
(per 1,000 inhabitants), plus gures relative to average wages in banking as
a percentage of total wages and a market concentration index based on the
percentage of total assets in banking held by the 5 top institutions in each
country.
When we divide EU countries in "monopolist" and "not monopolist"
types according to the previous classication, we observe the following:
a) Monopolist countries are characterized on average by lower market
concentration. Again this could be interpreted in two opposite ways: on
one side, this feature suggests less market power and a more competitive
banking system; on the other side, it could as well be that the central bank
- regulator raised excessive barriers to merges and acquisitions in the sector
thereby limiting the role of the market and prot-seeking behaviour.
b) Figures relative to capacity indicators are roughly similar, indicating
only a somehow smaller presence of both ATMs and employees and a higher
density of branches in monopolist countries.
26
4 Theoretical arguments
In spite of the huge literature on central banking and monetary policy
27
, an
aspect that has not been deeply analyzed yet is whether the regulatory and
supervisory functions should be attributed to central banks or to a dierent
agency. An additional interesting question to ask is which agency should be
responsible for antitrust regulation in the banking system.
The problem of institutional separation between banking supervision and
monetary policy has been started to be investigated only recently, even
though the traditional literature on central banking (from Bagehot, 1873,
on) somehow tackled the problem. Some contributions are Heller (1991),
Goodhart and Shoenmaker (1992 and 1995), Masciandaro (1993), Tuya and
26
Wages in banking as a percentage of total wages are similar across the two groups. If
a dierence is to be underlined, this refers to higher wages in central-southern European
countries with respect to the Anglo-Saxon and Northern Europe world.
27
See Goodhart (1995), Fischer (1996,1997) and Blinder (1998). Cuckierman (1992),
Alesina and Summers (1993) and Persson and Tabellini (1996) deal with the problems of
political and economic independence, credibility and coordination of monetary with scal
policy.
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Zamalloa (1994), Haubrich (1996) and Davies (1997). All these papers under-
line both the advantages and disadvantages of separating versus combining
the two functions.
As Tuya and Zamalloa (1994) make clear, there is a cross eect of banking
supervision over monetary policy and viceversa. In fact, monetary policy
decision-makers are concerned about the safety and soundness of the banking
system for the eect it may have on the integrity of the payment system, the
transmission of monetary policy signals, resource allocations and the cost of
monetary policy in case of crises. Banks supervisors, on the other hand, are
interested in monetary stability, since this is associated with lower volatility
in nominal and real interest rates and, possibly, in exchange rates.
4.1 The advantages of banking supervision in the Cen-
tral bank
The advantages of having banking supervision combined with monetary pol-
icy in the Central bank are important as this solution entails relevant infor-
mation on both macro and microeconomic variables.
 The Central bank will be able to acquire valuable insights into the
overall state of the economy by being involved in the supervision and
regulation of nancial institutions. A recent study on the US economy
(Peek, Rosengren and Tootell, 1997) shows that condential supervi-
sory information on bank ratings allows the Federal Reserve to improve
signicantly the forecast of macroeconomic variables as the rates of in-
ation and unemployment, thus allowing monetary policy to react in
a better way to the eventual deviation of these forecasts from the tar-
get. Besides, "being able to inuence bank policy through regulatory
pressure might give additional force and impetus to monetary policy
measures" (Heller, 1991). According to this view, the coordination of
monetary policy and banking supervision is necessary given that they
are interrelated. In particular, monetary policy must use proper in-
struments such that its transmission through nancial intermediaries
to the real sector is ecient.
 Another fundamental macro argument supporting a unied agency is
the protection of the payment system, a key channel for the poten-
tial spread of contagion risk. "The Central banks' growing awareness
15
of the liquidity and the credit risks in net and gross (with uncollat-
eralized overdrafts) settlements systems and their implicit or explicit
assumption of these risks, have initiated several risk reduction policies:
the most direct measure used to be, and still is, to control access and
monitor the participants" (Goodhart and Shoenmaker, 1992).
 The main argument for combining the functions of monetary and su-
pervisory management within the Central bank is however linked to the
Central bank's concern for the systemic stability of the nancial sys-
tem (Goodhart and Shoenmaker, 1995). Hence, the micro-information
advantage suggest that "combination is particularly needed in times
of nancial crises when only direct supervision can deliver the essen-
tial information on time" (Haubrich, 1996). In fact, a Central bank
supervising the banking system might know more precisely if a bank
asking for credit from the lender of last resort is insolvent or just illiq-
uid (thereby deserving it); but Goodhart and Shoemaker (1995) show
empirically that this argument does not hold in the sense that "the
revealed preference of monetary authorities has been to rescue banks
running into diculties, so long as there appeared to be any risk of a
systemic knock-on eect". It could also be that this traditional mo-
tivation to have the two functions in charge of a unique institutions
is today obsolete: runs seem to occur only in textbooks because "the
probability that a modern bank is solvent but illiquid and at the same
time lacks collateral to obtain regular central bank funding, is quite
small" (Padoa Schioppa 1999).
4.2 The disadvantages of banking supervision in the
Central bank
The major disadvantage of assigning to Central banks the joint responsibility
for the two functions is the "conict of interest" argument.
We classify the conicts that can possibly emerge in the following cate-
gories:
 First, a general problem of inconsistent policy assignment can emerge,
given that with just one policy instrument there are two objectives to
control: a trade-o among monetary stability and microstability of -
nancial intermediaries (in particular, banking intermediaries) may exist
16
and be dicult to tackle. In fact, it could well be that monetary author-
ities might wish for higher interest rates (e.g. to maintain an exchange
rate peg, to bear down on ination, or to reduce the pace of monetary
growth) while the regulatory authorities "are frightened about the ad-
verse eect such higher rates may have upon the bad debts, protabil-
ity, capital adequacy and solvency of the banking system. It is in this
guise that the conict has, indeed, from time to time occurred" (Good-
hart and Shoenmaker, 1992)
28
. The alternative situation, monetary
policy being conducted with excessive regard for supervisory concerns
about the health of one or more nancial institutions, is potentially
even more dangerous as it might lead to inappropriate monetary poli-
cies that might, in the long run, even worsen the problems at stake
(Heller, 1991).
 The combination of functions might also lead to expectations on the
part of the private sector that "the Central bank might be inuenced
by nancial system stability considerations when determining mone-
tary policy" (Goodhart and Shoemaker, 1995). This "inuence" may
be caused by a regulatory capture and rent seeking behavior by inter-
mediaries and by reputation costs that are perceived to be very high
for Central banks in case of a bank failure. Being involved in the crisis
of a bank under its control may as well hurt the Central bank global
credibility, with negative eects on its ability of controlling ination.
In fact, a reduced credibility could induce worse ination expectations
that are relevant determinant of ination itself.
 Other conicts of interest may arise as "the Central bank may em-
ploy access to the discount window and monetary reserves as banking
28
Di Giorgio (1999) argues that it is also possible that a conict of interest emerges as
a consequence, in given periods, of a preference for lower interest rates by the monetary
authority. In a context of price stability and low growth, it might be desirable for the
monetary authority to reduce interest rates; however, if the banking sector is characterized
by low protability and by a pronounced exposure of the asset side of the balance sheet
to market interest rates with respect to the liability side, it is possible that a reduction in
interest rates contributes to further deteriorate bank protability, at least in the short run,
and is thereby opposed by the regulatory agency. This argument is applied to explain the
prudent behavior of the Bank of Italy in terms of the chosen path for the ocial rates of
interest (the discount rate and the one on xed-term advances) in 1997 and in 1998 prior
to the start of EMU.
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supervision sanctioning tools to encourage banks to implement supervi-
sory recommendation" (Tuya and Zamalloa, 1991). In this case banks
would rarely appeal supervisory sanctions for the fear of raising reserve
requirements, or receiving inspections.
29
 "A more general point is that the cyclical eects of micro (regulatory)
and macro (monetary) policy tend to conict. Macro-monetary policy
is supposed to be counter-cyclical, while the eect of regulation, e.g.
capital adequacy requirements, tend to be procyclical" (Goodhart and
Shoenmaker, 1992). An example of procyclical eect of regulation on
credit growth is that "during a period of economic slowdown, a banks
volume of non performing assets is likely to be increasing and the bank
supervisor will be requiring higher provisions for possible loan losses
and applying pressure on the banks to improve the quality of their port-
folios. The banks' implementation of the bank supervisor recommen-
dations (and prudent banking principles) would result in tighter credit
during an economic recession" (Tuya and Zamalloa, 1994). Monetary
policy expansionary reasons may push to lower the minimum capital
asset ratios to free resources for the economy but undermining the in-
termediaries' stability. A tight monetary policy, on the other side, may
have an impact on bank solvency as high interest rates increase the
risk of loan defaults in the banking system.
4.3 New institutional considerations
The pros and cons of the separation between the monetary policy and the
bank supervision agency do not seem overwhelming to describe a rst best
solution.
In particular, the conict of interest argument does not seem strongly
convincing given that, for example, raising interest rates do not necessarily
damage banks: it depends on the structure of the balance sheet and on the
possibility that the banks can or can not pass along to customers the new
rates
30
. The conict between counter-cyclical policies and the procyclicality
29
"This conict may also appear when the Central bank applies bank supervisory sanc-
tions to eect monetary policy - for example denying approval of branch license to a sound
bank in an attempt to coerce the bank into more active participation in the Central bank's
open market operations" (Tuya and Zamalloa, 1994).
30
See Di Giorgio (1999).
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of capital requirements seems to be more compelling. This is especially
evident when Central banks act according with the "too big to fail" principle:
in fact the action of the supervisor should be independent of the size of
supervised banks. However, "it is not easy for the regulator, in case of big
banks' crisis, not to be inuenced by administrative and political pressures
and by microeconomic and macroeconomic worries"
31
.
In this section we provide some new arguments in favour of the thesis of
separating monetary policy and banking supervision responsibilities. These
are based on other factors aecting institutional arrangements.
A rst consideration emerges with respect to an apparently unrelated
problem, that of deposit protection. As Goodhart and Shoemaker (1992 and
1995) show, it is useless to have a deposit insurance agency without any
supervisory powers given that, in this case, it would just act like a cash
department executing orders of other agencies. A deposit insurance agency
should have, like in the US (FDIC), supervisory powers
32
: it could in principle
be merged into the Central bank, but this solution could easily generate
moral hazard problems with both the bank managers and the depositors.
Hence, the optimal solution seems to give to an agency separated by the
Central bank both banking supervision and deposit insurance management:
otherwise two agencies would have the same supervisory powers and the costs
for the banking system woulg be doubled.
The second fact to consider is that the evolution of nancial market, in-
termediaries and instruments make them less dierent one from the others:
banks, securities rms and life insurance, investment and pension funds en-
gage in activities which are day by day more similar and linked
33
. Banks
remain special only for the fact that part of their liabilites (sight deposits)
are money and have a certain nominal value independent from market uc-
tuations. However, the percentage of sight deposits in bank liabilities (and
with respect to GDP) is falling in most advanced countries. It is hard to
believe that this remains a strong justication for dierent supervisory ar-
rangements, in particular given the existence of an explicit deposit insurance.
A common regulatory agency is thus needed, and many countries do in fact
have it (UK, Finland, Norway,etc.). If this agency were the Central bank,
expectations of the kind of "too central-bank-supervised to fail" institutions
31
De Bonis and Luberti (1997).
32
See Di Noia, (1994).
33
See Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), Allen and Santomero (1997), Di Giorgio and Di
Noia (1999).
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could arise. As a matter of fact, Central banks did already intervene in the
past to bail out non banking nancial intermediaries (see for example some
recent case in Japan): moral hazard problems could emerge again, negatively
aecting market discipline.
In any case Central banks should not have antitrust powers in the banking
industry. Actually, this is a problem which is relevant only in a few countries,
Italy being the most relevant example. The inevitable trade o that exists in
the short term between micro-stability and competition would lead Central
banks to obstacle the exit from the banking industry of inecient rms,
claiming that the negative impact on the real economy and investors might
be high
34
. This kind of behavior is clearly inecient given that the only
investors to protect dierently from others are the small depositors, who
already have deposit insurance: why bank bondholders should instead be
protected dierently than bondholders of industrial rms?
Another point is linked to the fact that in some institutional arrange-
ments, Central banks are also characterized by another, and much stronger,
conict of interest: they are allowed to hold shares in the banks that they
supervise. This happens again in Italy, where the Bank of Italy is one of the
greatest shareholders of Italian stocks
35
. In this case there is such a high
34
In Italy where antitrust in banking is in charge of the Central bank, it often happened
that the consultative opinions of the antitrust agency as regards cases of banking merg-
ers and acquisitions were opposite to the compelling decisions of the Bank of Italy (See
Cafagna and Sciolli, 1996).
35
The Bank of Italy has equity investment for two reasons: "just over half are held for the
benet of the sta pension fund; the Bank of Italy also parks part of its statutory reserves
in equities (this part of the portfolio was worth 860 billion lire at the end of 1996)" (The
Economist, 1997). Few public informations are available on its trading activities but public
data (Consob, 1999) are available for shareholdings exceeding 2% of capital in companies
listed in the Italian Stock Exchange. As of December 31st 1998, the Bank of Italy
possessed stakes higher than 2% of the capital in 12 listed companies (while stakes under
this threshold remain private information of the holder). It owned 7,89% of Italfondiario, a
middle term bank, plus many participations in important insurance companies (Generali,
4.74%; INA, 2.54%; La Fondiaria, 2.32%; etc.). In turn, these insurance companies own
relevant share in some of the biggest domestic banks (for example, Generali is the largest
shareholder of Banca Commerciale Italiana. And Generali's most important shareholder is
an investment bank, Mediobanca, whose capital is shared by the same Banca Commerciale
Italiana, Unicredito Italiano and Cassa di Risparmio di Roma, three former public-owned
banks. INA is instead a former public-owned insurance company that recently entered in
the rescue plan of a disastred public-owned bank, Banco di Napoli, in a joint venture with
another domestic bank that was at the time totally owned by the Italian Treasury, Banca
Nazionale del Lavoro). Finally, Bank of Italy is the second shareholder of Telecom Italia.
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correlation between the Central bank's decisions in terms of interest rates,
and the rate of return of its equity investments that the Government should
either impose a prohibition of investment in shares or at least an external
independent management of the pension fund as well as a full disclosure
of its investment portfolio. More importantly, a supervision agency should
never possess shares of supervised entities nor of other institutions possessing
shares in the same supervised entities.
However, our main argument in favor of separation is the one of the
appropriate nancing of monetary policy and banking supervision activity.
4.3.1 Central bank nancing
The problem of cost-accountability should lead to separating the two func-
tions of monetary policy and banking supervision. Usually Central banks are
mainly funded in two ways: seignorage and compulsory reserves.
On one side, they are legal monopolist in issuing liabilities at no cost
(cash) and investing them in nancial instruments and foreign currencies to
operate monetary policy. This funding independence is fundamental to cor-
rectly operate monetary policy even if, in many countries, the lack of political
and economic independence imposes the Central bank to issue liabilities in
excess, thereby increasing ination in the medium-long run. In any case,
there is no doubt that if Central banks were nanced by a transfer from
the Treasury, their independence could be seriously undermined. Moreover,
many Central banks at the end of each year return, depending on dierent
regulatory arrangements, to the Treasury part of their prots (like in UK or
in Italy), even if formally the Treasury is often not even a "shareholder" of
the Central Bank. Naturally, the presence of prots does not allow Central
banks to behave ineciently neither in monetary policy nor in any other ac-
tivity they could be performing. The reason is that these prots are gained
as a result of a legal monopoly, which is implicitly nanced by all taxpayers.
Another source of nancing can be due to the compulsory reserve regime.
In many countries banks are obliged to keep a fraction of the deposits they
collect in zero or low-interest deposits at the Central bank. Hopefully, the
rate of return of these sums is higher and contributes to nance part or all
of the Central bank activity
36
, including monetary policy. However it may
36
Bank of England is an interesting case. Since 1844 (and until 1997), the Bank has, for
accounting purposes, been divided into "Issue" and "Banking". The Issue Department is
solely concerned with the note issue, the assets backing the issue, the income generated by
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happen that the rate of interest paid on compulsory reserves, which is es-
tablished by the Central bank itself, is temporarily higher than the risk-free
market rate
37
: in this case, the Central bank (and eventually all taxpayers
given that some seignorage is always in place) is subsidizing the domestic
banking system (given that only domestic banks are subject to reserve re-
quirements) and at the same time creating obstacles to competition among
national and foreign banks.
As a consequence of these considerations, we see two problems in having
banking supervision assigned to the Central bank.
First, the cost of supervision is merged with the one of monetary policy:
in this way, eciency in supervisory activity could be weakened given that
there is no separate cost accountability, or it would at least be dicult to
assess.
Across countries, Central banks have dierent costs which are of course
dicult to compare given that the activities they actually perform are quite
dierent. Davies (1997) documents the dierence in (1992) cost of various
Central banks, controlling for both size and population: a striking result is
that, for example, the Bank of Italy seems to cost 5 times more than the Bank
of England, even if both were at the time in charge of banking supervision
38
.
One could argue that the solution is not necessarily that Central banks quit
supervisory responsibilities: they could just have a separate budget assigned
in their balance sheet for this function. However, in this way there will be
some inevitable "transfer pricing" among the dierent departments and the
gures would not be precise, given the presence of economies of scope in the
dierent activities.
39
those assets and the costs incurred by the Bank in printing, issuing, sorting and destroying
notes: the entire prots of the note issue are paid over to HM Treasury. The Banking
Department (all the rest of the Bank) is funded by Cash Ratio Deposits which banks in
the UK place interest-free with the Bank, on the basis of the size of its eligible liabilities
(0.35%): the Banking Department's income derives principally from investment in British
Goverment securities, Treasury and commercial bills and advances to customers (Bank of
England, 1997a).
37
This situation happened in Italy during 1997. See Di Giorgio (1997).
38
A major cost component for the Bank of Italy is however linked to the functions that
it performs acting as the Cash department of the Ministry of the Treasury.
39
The Bank of England Annual Report shows cost allocation for the dierent operations:
bank supervision cost 19% of all Bank's operating costs. More correctly a fraction of the
cost of other departments (like Finance and Resources (3% of the total) and Personnel
(7%) should be added).
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Second, it is not necessarily true that the supervisory cost of an industry
must be paid by all taxpayers, who may not be consumers of the good: it
could be possible that these costs can be paid directly by the supervised
entities and the consumers of these products. This is what happens for
many other regulatory agencies. The objection that banking stability could
be viewed as a public good seems too strong to us, and in any case it is not
clear that the cost of banking supervision and regulation coincide with that
of the stability of the banking system. Moreover, from the point of view of
macroeconomic stability there is no doubt that also the well functioning of
the industrial system is important; however, there is no agency in charge of
the stability of this system which is nanced by all taxpayers.
On the other side, it is not necessarily ecient that the costs of monetary
policy and of other Central banks' activities (including eventually banking
supervision) must be paid by banks: in fact Central banks' revenues would be
cyclical and thus lower in period of crisis of banks when exactly supervision
must be strengthened.
Again this does not necessarily mean that a separate entity is needed
but certainly a separate entity would be more accountable for the use of this
money: it would be clearer who is paying and for what.
In this case, the problem of being nanced by the industry rather than by
a public transfer would be also another one. The public transfer, in a sense,
limits the activities of the agency and so an industry-nancing enhances the
independence of the agency. But in this way there is the classic problem
of taxation without representation as the supervisory agency could expand
its revenues without limit (Sarcinelli, 1996). This could be avoided having
independent representatives appointed by the industry as commissioners of
the agency.
The solution we view as the most acceptable is that the Central bank is
only nanced by seignorage in order to operate monetary policy, and not at
all by compulsory reserves. Should reserve requirments be considered as an
integral part of a strategy of monetary control, mandatory reserves should
be remunerated at a market rate or, better, invested in a money-market
fund so that the eective rate of return produced could be redistributed to
the industry. The separated banking supervision agency should instead be
nanced in a mixed way: partly with a public transfer and partly by the
industry.
23
5 Financial regulation in the EMU: a pro-
posal.
In the European Monetary Union (EMU), the principle of separating mon-
etary policy and banking supervision responsibilities has been clearly es-
tablished in the statute of the European Central Bank (ECB). The latter
empowers the ECB to set out and conduct monetary policy in the Euro area,
but seems to assign the responsibility for banking supervision to the national
authorities.
In a way, it could then be argued that a problem of institutional separation
between monetary policy and banking supervision agencies does not exist any
longer in the Euro area.
40
Actually, in this area, as in most industrialised countries, the term bank-
ing supervision should be replaced by that of nancial supervision. Banks
are no longer so special: they perform many tasks and oer dierent nancial
services (universal banks), including investment and insurance services; they
are often part of industrial companies (and/or they control them). The sta-
bility of the nancial system is not so much at risk because of the loan/deposit
activities performed by banks. Instead, nancial instability could be induced
by activities linked to portfolio management, which are typical of investment
banks and securities rms.
41
Hence, the real problem to tackle should be
the separation between the tasks of monetary policy and nancial supervi-
sion.
The current institutional arrangement in the EMU, however, is far from
satisfactory for a series of reasons.
1) In some countries, like Italy and the Netherlands, where the national
central bank (NCB) is a monopolist in banking supervision, the separation
is not complete as the NCB Governor does also participate to the denition
of the general strategies of European monetary policy which are set out in
40
In fact, "even in countries where the competent authority for banking supervision is
the central bank, by denition this authority is, functionally speaking, no longer a central
bank, as it lacks the key central banking task of autonomously controlling money creation"
(Padoa Schioppa, 1999). For this reason, the argument of the eventual separation between
the agencies responsible for monetary policy and banking supervision has necessarily to
be discussed at a European level.
41
A well known recent example of a serious threat to nancial stability is the LTCM
case. Here, a non bank institution was rescued thanks to the moral suasion of the FED,
that is not responsible for the supervision of hedge funds.
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the ECB Governing Council.
2) Does it make any sense to have a common monetary policy and aim at
an always more integrated nancial system in the Euro area while keeping
dierent nancial regulations and supervising rules in each member country?
As a matter of fact, these institutional dierences are an important barrier
to further nancial integration. In this eld, the principle of minimum
harmonization and mutual recognition, that was originally thought to be able
to naturally induce over time a convergence of regulatory behaviour and more
uniform rules, clearly did not work. Moreover, there is a concrete risk that
competition in this area will not even generate the more ecient outcome:
on one side there exists an obvious incentive to promote less demanding
domestic nancial regulations and supervision in order to let the own country
become more attractive for running nancial business; while on the other
side it is not clear who will pay the costs of potential insolvency following
excessive risk taking behavior and nancial misconduct in a member country
(see 3) below). Finally, with increasing international banking activities
and a European real time gross settlement system in place (Target), the
argument that domestic regulators and supervisors have better knowledge
and can exercise more ecient control becomes day by day less eective.
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3) No clear tool nor any reponsibility to counter and/or manage the risk of
nancial instability and crisis has been established in Europe. The Treaty is
silent on this topic. It is not even evident that the role of lender of last resort
will be performed by the ECB, as it would be desirable being an essential
function of a Central bank. In fact, this solution will probably occurr only
in the case of a widely spread liquidity crisis aecting the whole Euro area.
But what will follow a liquidity crisis located in a single country? And what
a solvency crisis? Who takes care of nancial stability in Europe?
43
Suppose we face a situation in which a single nancial institution located
in a member country is in trouble. What kind of intervention, if any, is
currently allowed? One of the typical forms of public intervention seems
lost, and probably the most natural, that of Central bank last resort loans.
The ECB will not intervene in favour of a single institution, expecially if
its nancial links are mostly domestic. Also because it could always assign
some of the responsibility for the crisis to the domestic nancial regulator-
42
See also Prati and Schinasi (1999) and Lannoo (1998).
43
See Bini Smaghi (1998,a) for a broader discussion, and De Cecco (1998) on the rele-
vance of the role of lender of last resort.
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supervisor. The domestic Central bank can not intervene by providing funds
without an explicit authorization by the ECB. In this case, it will have to
convince the latter that the institution is facing a liquidity and not a solvency
crisis, according to the Bagehot's doctrine (1873), and / or that the risk of
potential spread and contagion of the crisis is high. This requires time and
resources.
The other two traditional instruments, bail out through a safety net pro-
vided by the banking system or through the government budget will ulti-
mately shift the burden on the shoulders of domestic taxpayers, expecially
in the framework established in the Stability and Growth Pact. Given the
current level of taxes in Europe, this is hardly an optimal solution.
We think that a much higher degree of coordination in the eld of nancial
regulation and prudential supervision is both desirable and needed in the
EMU. Moreover, our view is not limited to the banking system but embraces
all nancial intermediaries. Hence, we see three possible paths of institutional
changes that can reintroduce the function of lending of last resort in the Euro
area and at the same time allow for a sounder scenario in case of a nancial
crisis. We list them in increasing order according to our preferences, but we
view all of them as better solutions with respect to the current situation.
1) The rst possibility is to assign supervisory powers and responsibilites
in the banking sector to the ECB. However, as it would be desirable to have
a common supervisor for all nancial intermediaries, an amendement of the
Maastricht Treaty would be necessary, as the latter explicitely forbids that
supervisory powers regarding insurance rms be assigned to the ECB.
2) A new European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS), structured
similarly to the ESCB, could be established. A European Financial Regula-
tion Authority (EFRA) should be at the centre of the system. This would
harmonize and coordinate nancial regulation in member countries, design
common principles and guidelines for prudential supervision and set out ap-
propriate disclosure instruments and requirements. It should be in charge of
banks, securities rms, mutual, pension and hedge funds, life insurance and
all nancial intermediaries and securities markets.
The EFRA should be formally separated by the ECB, both in order to
avoid excessive concentration of powers as well as for the arguments made
26
above.
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In each country, a (new) agency similar in structure to the Financial
Service Authority recently established in the UK will participate to the def-
inition of the general strategies and principles of nancial regulation in the
area, becoming a member of the ESFS. This agency will be responsible for
the implementation in the domestic country of both the rules and the su-
pervisory duties agreed upon at the Euro level.
45
In each single country,
this agency will be the sole responsible for nancial stability and correct
disclosure of all nancial intermediaries.
3) Establish two new dierent European Agencies, one responsible for
the "stability" and one for "transparency and disclosure requirements" of
all nancial intermediaries. The two central agencies should coordinate the
dierent domestic agencies in each member country. In this solution, we will
then have two dierent ESFS according to the principles that suggest to re-
place "institutional" regulation by "functional regulation" (or by objective).
Under both 2) and 3), no antitrust power will be given to any member of
the ESFS, so as to avoid the trade-o between competition on one side and
stability and transparncy on the other. Moreover, agencies responsible for
supervising market competition do exist at both Euro and domestic levels.
A special Committee (and desk) for the lending of last resort function
will be established at the ECB, with the participation (only for information
and communication purposes) of members of the (one or two) ESFS. The
ESFS (or the one responsible for "stability") will promote the participation
of intermediaries, in each country, to a limited insurance fund that could
provide good quality collateral to institutions facing liquidity problems in
order to be able to qualify for central bank nancing. The national agency
will manage the fund and assess whether an institution is just illiquid or
insolvent. In the latter case, provision of collateral should be denied. The
domestic government could still decide whether to bail out the institution or
44
A relevant issue is "who pays for nancial supervision and how much it costs". An
attribution to the ECB of these functions could be less transparent given that they may
be confused in the monetary policy ones (thus inducing lower accountability).
45
Both the national and the central European levels of nancial supervisors should exist,
given the current level of harmonization in the nancial market legislation, which is far
from complete, in particular with respect to taxation, accounting rules and banking crises
management.
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not, being responsible and (politically) accountable for the decision.
6 Conclusions
The institutional separation of the agencies in charge of monetary policy
and banking supervision is an important issue. In most developed coun-
tries, Central banks are not any longer "monopolist" in banking supervision.
Empirical comparisons among dierent nancial systems are dicult to eval-
uate: banks seem to be more protable if Central bank supervise them but
show higher sta costs and issue less bonds, which could be interpreted as
an indicator of lower eciency.
On the macroeconomic side, the ination rate is conrmed to be higher
and more volatile if Central bank is "distracted" by supervision. New,
though still preliminar, evidence shown in this paper seems to suggest that
banks supervised by Central banks are relatively more protable on the de-
posit side than on the lending side: as this trend could eventually stop be-
cause of further nancial markets integration, their competitive position may
be more at risk unless they expand protability on the lending side and on
some other activities (risk management, services, etc.). Weether Central
banks acting as supervisors may have played a role in this situation remains
a question for further investigations.
In any case, we conclude that a clear motivation for the separation be-
tween monetary policy and bank supervisory agencies can not be found in
data. Rather, the evolution of nancial intermediaries, moral hazard problem
and especially cost accountability seem to suggest that a separation could be
a better solution, also in order to clarify who is really paying for the costs of
monetary policy and banking supervision.
We also criticize the current assignment of nancial regulatory and su-
pervisory powers in the EU to domestic agencies. We are in favour of the
establishment of two new European nancial regulation agencies, each for-
mally separated by the ECB. These agencies should be responsible for the
comprehensive coordination of both legislation and execution of regulation
in nancial markets: the rst European agency should be responsible for the
stability of all intermediaries, while the second for transparency and disclo-
sure requirements. Our proposal is to to place these two agencies at the
centre of two European Systems of Financial Supervisors, each structured
similarly to the ESCB and thereby requiring active participation of national
28
agencies in member countries.
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Table 1: Monetary policy and bank supervisory agencies in industrialized countries (1.1.1998)
(adapted from Haubrich, 1996, and Tuya and Zamalloa, 1994)
COUNTRY MONETARY POLICY AGENCY BANK SUPERVISORY AGENCY
Central bank
monopolist
Australia Reserve Bank of Australia Reserve Bank of Australia
Greece Bank of Greece Bank of Greece
Iceland Central Bank of Iceland Central Bank of Iceland
Ireland Central Bank of Ireland Central Bank of Ireland
Italy Banca d'Italia Banca d'Italia
Luxembourg Luxembourg Monetary Institute Luxembourg Monetary Institute
Netherlands De Nederlandsche Bank De Nederlandsche Bank
New Zealand Reserve Bank of New Zealand Reserve Bank of New Zealand
Portugal Banco de Portugal Banco de Portugal
Spain Banco de España Banco de España
Turkey Central Bank of the Republic of TurkeyCentral Bank of the Republic of Turkey
Central bank 
not-monopolist
Austria National Bank of Austria Ministry of Finance
Belgium National Bank of Belgium Banking and Finance Commission
Canada Bank of Canada Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions
Denmark Danmarks Nationalbank Finance Inspectorate
Finland Bank of Finland Financial Supervision Authority
France Banque de France Commission Bancaire, Banque de France
Germany Deutsche Bundesbank Federal Banking Supervisory Office
Japan Bank of Japan Ministry of Finance, Bank of Japan
Mexico Banco de Mexico National Banking and Securities Commission
Norway Norges Bank Banking, Insurance and Securities Commission
Sweden Sveriges Riksbank Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority
Switzerland Swiss National Bank Federal Banking Commission
United Kingdom Bank of England Financial Services Authority   (from 1998)
United States Federal Reserve System OCC, FDIC, FED, State Governments
Table 2: Average inflation rate and coefficient of variation (standard deviation/average) (1960-96)
in "monopolist" and "not-monopolist" OECD countries
(Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF)
Inflation rate Stand.Dev./Avg.
(%)
"MONOPOLIST" COUNTRIES
Australia 6.20 65.65
Greece 11.78 68.68
Iceland 22.46 85.57
Ireland 7.53 77.69
Italy 8.30 67.83
Luxembourg 4.13 68.77
Netherlands 4.29 63.17
New Zealand 5.93 55.48
Portugal 11.91 69.94
Spain 9.19 58.65
United Kingdom 7.16 64.47
Turkey 35.62 87.25
AVERAGE 11.21 69.43
AVG. w/o Turkey and Iceland 7.64 66.03
"NOT-MONOPOLIST" COUNTRIES
Austria 4.16 47.12
Belgium 4.45 67.19
Canada 4.92 66.26
Denmark 6.22 55.63
Finland 6.63 64.86
France 5.89 62.65
Germany 3.34 52.40
Japan 4.86 88.48
Norway 5.93 55.48
Sweden 6.34 51.26
Switzerland 3.67 59.67
USA 4.70 64.47
AVERAGE 5.09 61.29
Graph 1: Inflation rate in "monopolist" and "not-monopolist" OECD countries (average consumer price index 1960-96)
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Graph 2: Inflation rate in "monopolist" and "not-monopolist" OECD countries, excluding Iceland and Turkey
(average consumer price index 1960-96)
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Table 3: Pricing behavior of banks in some European countries (1981-95)
(Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF)
Mark-down Mark-up Spread Mark-down/Spread Mark-up/Spread
"Monopolist" countries
Ireland 4.88 0.41 5.29 0.92 0.08
Italy 4.40 2.32 6.73 0.74 0.26
Netherlands 2.72 3.25 5.97 0.40 0.60
Spain 2.43 1.40 3.84 0.69 0.31
United Kingdom 0.96 0.49 1.44 0.74 0.26
AVERAGE 3.08 1.57 4.65 0.70 0.30
"Not-Monopolist" countries
Belgium 3.13 2.98 6.11 0.48 0.52
Germany 0.56 4.90 5.45 0.11 0.89
Sweden 2.26 3.19 5.45 0.39 0.61
Switzerland 0.04 1.06 1.09 0.01 0.99
AVERAGE 1.50 3.03 4.53 0.25 0.75
Mark-down is the difference between Treasury Bill rate (60c) and deposit rate (60l) 
Mark-up is the difference between Lending rate (60p) and Treasury Bill rate (60c)
Spread  is the difference between Lending rate (60p) and Deposit rate (60l)
The numbers in brackets are the codes of the series in International Financial Statistics, IMF
Graph 3: Pricing behavior of banks in some European countries (1981-95)
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Table 4: Bank balance sheet comparisons between the "all banks" series and the "commercial banks" series 
in "monopolist" and "not-monopolist" countries (Average 1985-94. Source: OECD, 1996)
All banks in All banks in Commercial banks Commercial banks
monopolist not-monopolistin monopolist in not-monopolist
countries countries countries w/o Turkeycountries
% of average balance sheet total
Interest income 9.86 8.36 11.86 8.42
Interest expenses 6.88 6.38 9.16 6.08
Net interest income 3.03 1.98 2.69 2.34
Non-interest income (net) 1.10 0.96 1.62 1.11
Gross income 4.12 2.95 4.31 3.45
Operating expenses 2.55 2.09 2.88 2.44
Net income 1.57 0.85 1.43 1.01
Provisions (net) 0.70 0.59 0.77 0.60
Profit before tax 0.87 0.28 0.66 0.41
Income tax 0.32 0.13 0.24 0.21
Profit after tax 0.55 0.14 0.42 0.19
Distributed profit 0.31 0.12 0.24 0.18
Retained profit 0.24 -0.06 0.24 -0.05
Staff costs 1.54 1.05 1.68 1.15
Provisions on loans 0.76 0.53 0.93 0.68
Provisions on securities 0.14 0.03 0.00 0.05
% of gross income
Net interest income 73.35 68.18 61.82 69.62
Non-interest income (net) 26.65 31.82 38.18 30.38
Operating expenses 62.31 70.39 60.14 72.60
Net income 37.69 29.61 39.86 27.40
Provisions (net) 16.71 19.44 20.55 16.95
Profit before tax 20.97 10.88 19.31 10.45
Income tax 7.45 4.91 6.69 6.29
Profit after tax 12.56 5.96 12.62 4.16
Staff costs 38.68 36.16 35.69 34.64
% of net income
Provisions (net) 43.61 53.71 52.78 55.34
Profit before tax 56.39 48.28 47.22 43.55
Income tax 20.18 13.98 16.88 17.43
Profit after tax 33.49 34.30 30.33 26.12
% of year-end balance sheet total
Assets
Cash&balance with C.B. 4.94 1.52 7.06 2.21
Interbank deposits 14.03 22.13 21.45 14.58
Loans 48.93 53.83 46.47 57.61
Securities 14.99 15.71 15.47 16.73
Other assets 17.11 6.81 9.55 9.12
Liabilities
Capital & reserves 7.88 4.65 4.93 5.22
Borrowing from C.B. 1.36 1.99 0.84 2.57
Interbank deposits 12.51 24.58 18.59 20.84
Non-bank deposits 54.70 45.71 64.16 54.30
Bonds 5.94 13.80 3.77 6.56
Other liabilities 24.00 9.27 12.35 13.11
Memoranda
Short-term securities 4.01 3.39 6.11 3.40
Bonds 9.12 9.85 9.04 9.55
Shares and participations 1.81 1.99 1.82 2.50
Claims on non-residents 13.81 21.85 44.83 23.08
Liability to non-residents 14.49 24.39 50.48 29.97
Foglio1
Table 5: Market Structure in Banking in EU countries according to the regulatory regime 
Countries branches ATMs employeeswages in bankingConcentra-
Monop (per 1,000 inhab.)(per 1,000 inhab.)(per 1,000 inhab.)(as a % of total wages)ti n index
Greece 0.24 0.14 5.21 106
Ireland 0.3 0.28 6.5 118 42.2
Italy 0.43 0.42 6.14 219.5 26.1
Netherlands 0.44 0.37 7.2 136.1 75.4
Portugal 0.38 0.45 6 160 80
Spain 0.95 0.76 6.28 153.2 44.35
UK 0.32 0.31 7.91 133 28
Luxembourg 0.85 0.53 45.02 182 21.81
Avg. 0.545 0.335 6.56 144 32.005
Not Monop
Austria 0.58 0.48 9.64 38.96
Belgium 0.74 0.41 7.5 172.78 55
Denmark 0.42 0.24 8.3 117 78
France 0.44 0.42 6.9 168 41.2
Germany 0.58 0.46 9.17 16.67
Sweden 0.28 0.27 4.9 133 86.21
Finland 0.34 0.45 5.56 116.6 73.56
Avg. 0.46 0.465 7.6 141.476 56.26
1996 Data.Source: ECB
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